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REVIEW OF RELIGIOUS RESEARCH

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RELIGION AND THE INTEGRATION OF SOCIETY

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One of the abiding general propositions of sociology is that religion serves the central and crucial function in society of supporting what has been variously called social integration, social solidarity, and social cohesion. (Vide Tillich's *Dynamics of Faith*, Harper, 1956, and Robert Bellah's unpublished paper, "Some Suggestions for the Systematic Study of Religion.") Underlying this proposition is the still more general one, namely, that, in order to maintain itself, every society must achieve some consensus around a set of basic values, some agreement that they are meaningful and afford an appropriate basis for social organization and common action.

The concept of social integration is an ideal-typical one. It does not imply that every society achieves universal consensus or that every one of a society's members shares precisely the same set of values. It is argued, however, that considerable consensus must exist if a society is to withstand diversity and cleavage without breaking down. Where consensus is at a minimum, collective social action becomes more and more difficult to achieve, and eventually a state of disintegration or social disorganization sets in.

· The term "integration" has a favorable connotation in our language, "disintegration" an unfavorable one. However, as the term is being used here, to say that a group or a society is highly integrated is not necessarily to express approval of it. There are instances in history of highly integrated societies which have been judged, by outsiders at least, as approbrious. Hitler's Germany, for example, was for a time highly integrated; there existed a high degree of consensus around a set of basic, though questionable, values. While it certainly cannot always be associated with the "good," integration nevertheless appears to be a necessary condition to effective social organization and control.

Religion has been especially singled out as the prime force in the creation and maintenance of social integration. A number of scholars, Durkheim among them, have expressed the belief that religion is so important to social

integration that, without it, social disintegration would inevitably follow. Its integrating role is seen as manifold. *One*, through its belief system, it gives basic support to social and individual values. *Two*, through its ritual, it repeatedly reinforces identification with and commitment to these values. *Three*, through its system of eternal rewards and punishments, it helps to insure the embodiment and acting out of values in behavior.

We have lived with these notions for a considerable time now. Developed at the turn of the century, they have continued to be salient, with little modification, ever since. As we attempt, however, to apply them to contemporary American society—or for that matter to any existing society, whether primitive or modern—we are confronted with a number of difficulties.

For one thing, we find it difficult to reconcile the general theory with the considerable evidence of religious conflict. On every side, it would seem that religion threatens social integration as readily as it contributes to it. Some scholars have recently suggested that it is religion which today divides Americans most. Not only does the present situation seem not to jibe with the theory, but neither does the historical situation. The history of Christianity, with its many schisms, manifests the great power of religion not only to bind but to divide.

It is also difficult to find evidence that, with increasing secularization, there is a general decay of social and personal values. To be sure, the values of Western society have changed during the past centuries and are still changing. Some observers have lamented that the changes in America reflect a gradual departure from the values of the Judaeo-Christian heritage and attribute many of our social ills to this fact. At the same time, however, our society appears to be maintaining itself with a reasonable degree of success. Moreover, many of the pathologies of contemporary society are paralleled by significant advances in social responsibility and individual ethical conduct. Though only the future can decide the question, there seems to be no immediate danger of the disintegration of our society or the wholesale retrogression of our moral life.

What seems evident, certainly in modern complex societies and probably in most primitive ones as well, is that religion is not the only source and support of social values. It may be making a contribution in this respect, but the contribution is clearly not an exclusive one. It is also highly unlikely that religion has ever been the sole source of social cohesion. It becomes relevant to ask, therefore: what are the ways in which religion enters into and influences human values and human action and, more parochially,

what contribution is religion making currently to the value structure of American society? At this juncture, let us consider several defining concepts.

Norms, Values, and Beliefs

Social integration requires and presupposes consensus on three distinct levels. First of all, there must be agreement on norms. Norms are prescriptions for action; they formulate the accepted ways of doing things. Second, there must be agreement on the values which the norms embody or further. Values underlie norms in the sense that they sum up what makes the norm worthwhile and a proper and good way of behaving. Third, there must be considerable agreement in belief concerning the nature of man and the world, that is, there must be agreement that the nature of reality makes a particular set of values both viable and rational.

In a stable society, most action follows directly from the norms. The norms prescribe what is to be done in given situations and action follows almost automatically without any question being raised explicitly as to the meaning of the action. For example, we get up in the morning early enough to allow us to get to work on time. We tip our hat when we greet a lady. Ordinarily, we do these things without hesitation and without even contemplating possible alternatives.

This kind of rote action is very important to social integration and to the integration of the personality. If we paused to consider the meaning of every act, our ability to make decisions would be seriously hampered; we should certainly find ourselves frustrated and confused and eventually unable to act at all.

The ability of norms to function in and of themselves as effective guides to behavior is a consequence, of course, of the socialization process. From earliest childhood we are indoctrinated in the norms so that acting in conformity to them becomes almost instinctive. Indoctrination in the norms also involves, however, indoctrination in values and beliefs, subtly as this may be done. We come to learn what is expected of us, but we also develop a sense, however vague, of the meaning and value-import of these expectations.

If norms are described as prescribed ways of behaving, then a value can be defined as a preference for some state of being. Americans value democracy insofar as they prefer democracy over other forms of political organization. Beliefs, often confused with values, are to be distinguished from them in that they are not preferences but constitute statements about the true

nature of things. As we shall see shortly, values *and* norms may be raised
in a society to the status of beliefs, that is, they may be seen not as prefer-
ences but as unalterable elements of the nature of things. Ordinarily, how-
ever, the indicated distinction holds.

The three concepts may also be distinguished in the following way: norms
deal with means, values with ends, and beliefs with their rationale. One
norm of our society, for example, prescribes that Americans vote on election
day. Voting, then, is a means for the realization of the end-value of democ-
racy. Democracy, in turn, is rationalized by belief—that all men are created
equal, for example, or that ability is not always equivalent to status at birth.
This suggests that norms are derived from values, and values from beliefs.
This is frequently the case, but it is not always so. Values and beliefs may
also "follow from" norms rather than the other way around.

Norms in Conflict

Theoretically, all action would automatically follow the norms in a
fully integrated society. There, occasion would never arise for questioning
the norms since complete consensus would exist at all three levels—norms,
values, and beliefs. In reality, of course, such complete integration probably
never exists. Almost inevitably, circumstances arise in which the norms are
not sufficient to govern action in and of themselves. This will be the case
when contradictory norms exist, when traditional norms are challenged by
new ones, when for one reason or another norms do not further the ends for
which they were designed, or when norms have been inadequately internalized.

Norms are often contradictory even in simple and homogeneous societies,
but in complex and pluralistic societies some contradiction almost always
exists. Consider, for example, the situation of a recently married Roman
Catholic girl whose husband, a Protestant, wishes to practice contraception.
The girl is being faced with clearly contradictory norms: the practice pre-
scribed by her Church and the practice her husband wishes to follow.

A society may be homogeneous and consistent in its norms and yet have
its traditional norms challenged by a new set of norms coming in from out-
side. The present situation in the South, in which the traditional norm of
segregation is being challenged by the norm of integration imposed from the
outside, is a case in point. Another is represented by the situation in rural
India, where recent government edicts threaten the traditional norms of the
caste system.

Norms can also lose their self-warranting character when they turn out to frustrate rather than to further some basic value of a society. This can happen because underlying values are changing and are rendering traditional ways of doing things obsolete and irrational. However, it can also happen that a devised norm turns out to have been ill-advised for one reason or another. This is especially the case with legal norms. In the thirties, the relatively permissive divorce laws in Russia were abandoned as destructive of the stability of the state despite the fact that they were theoretically consonant with Marxist ideals.

Finally, norms are not always so thoroughly internalized that they are automatic. Though the power of society is great, it is not absolute. Norms are always more or less internalized, and therefore always more or less open to doubt and challenge.

In situations of these kinds, some understanding of the import of the norm in question for basic values and beliefs is essential if doubt is to be resolved. Doubt may be overcome and a choice of norms made through a rational consideration of the values and beliefs underlying contradictory rules of behavior. The Southerner may rationally weigh the values and beliefs supporting segregation and those supporting integration and decide where he wishes to commit himself. More often, a choice for or against a norm merely reflects training so deeply ingrained as to be, in effect, irrevocable. In such cases, alternative norms, values, and beliefs are not seriously considered. Instead a norm is chosen or rejected because it is prescribed or forbidden by a particular institution in society to which commitment has become absolute.

The Nature of Commitment

The concept of commitment has a central bearing on social integration. In our theoretical model of the wholly-integrated society, there would be total consensus as to where primary commitment lies just as there would be consensus on norms, values, and beliefs. In actual societies, the locus of commitment becomes a problem wherever action does not directly follow from a norm. When conflicting norms imply distinct values and beliefs, then resolution of conflict can be achieved only through a decision as to where primary commitment lies: on the level of the norm itself or on other and deeper levels.

Locating one's primary commitment may be entirely relative to a particular conflict situation. Commitments to given norms, values, or beliefs may all be relative and insisted upon only in some contexts and not in others. At the same time, we can nevertheless conceive of ultimate commitments,

i.e., commitments which are inexorably held under all circumstances and con-
ditions. Commitments of such kinds may be said to be "sacred" in two senses:
one, they are held to be unalterable and, two, any sacrifice will be endured
in order to withstand a threat to the commitment.

The locus of a commitment, whether "sacred" or otherwise, may be a
belief, a value, or a norm. Where, for example, the commitment is to a
value, beliefs and norms as well as other values become subject to change
whenever they undermine that value. Thus, in time of war, the norm "thou
shalt not kill" and the belief in the sanctity of the individual are sacrificed
in order to sustain the commitment to what is more ultimately valued—the
nation. The ability of a nation to wage war—and presumably therefore to
maintain itself—is dependent upon a high degree of consensus that in fact
the nation represents an ultimate commitment. Were ultimate commitment
to be attached to the belief that human life is more sacred than national iden-
tity, war would not be possible.

But, as we have suggested, ultimate commitment may not always be
at the level of beliefs or values. It may exist at the level of the norm. In
such cases, values and beliefs are subject to change in the service of main-
taining the norm. The norm of segregation is a case in point. The members
of the White Citizens' Councils in the South have their primary commitment
to the "norm" of segregation. The values and beliefs which are conceived
to give meaning to this norm are relatively unimportant. In fact, the way
in which the norm is rationalized may shift and change. Thus, the White
Citizens' Council member may argue that his adherence to segregation is a
consequence of his belief that God ordained segregation, as is shown in
the Biblical story of Ham. Yet, his commitment to this belief is weaker than
his commitment to the norm. Faced with a different interpretation of the
Biblical story, he will find another belief to support what to his mind is an
unquestionable norm. Where norms are ultimate, beliefs are their servants.

Ultimate commitment is likely to be at the level of the norm wherever
the norm is deeply imbedded in the traditions of a society or group. Norms
have become so much a part of a way of life that they come to be perceived
as "sacred." In such instances, the values and beliefs which originally gave
meaning to the norms may no longer be applicable; they may indeed be
irrelevant to contemporary adherence to them. The meaning of the norms,
insofar as it exists and is rooted in other than bare self-interest, is supplied by
the high value placed on tradition or custom itself. The difficulty which the In-
dian government is experiencing in abolishing the caste system is illustrative
of the point. For the Indian peasant, the beliefs and values which produced

the caste system many years ago may be entirely forgotten and lost in history. Nevertheless, the commitment to the norm is as strong as if past values and past beliefs were still operative.

It might be argued that in cases like these not the norms but tradition itself is regarded as "sacred" and that ultimate commitment is to traditionalism as an end in itself. It is important to recognize, however, that conformity to traditionalism as a "sacred" ideal is largely achieved through an insistence on conformity to specific ways of behaving, that is, to norms.

Authority and Sanctions

In sum, it is important to social integration that the members of a society share commitments to certain norms, values, and beliefs and that some of these commitments be ultimate in character. The question arises as to how commitments are generated and sustained. It is not enough to say that what must operate is, in effect, a collective conscience. Left to themselves, the members of a society would not exhibit the kinds of commitments to collective means and ends necessary to produce social solidarity and stability. The United States, or any other country, would probably not succeed, for example, in recruiting the necessary defense forces in time of war on a completely voluntary basis. The commitment to the nation is not that strong.

Essential to producing commitment is some form of authority with the power of constraint over the members of a society. Societies depend not on one but on a number of sources of authority to produce the kinds of commitments necessary to assure that norms are acted out in practice. Four kinds of authority may be identified, each of which includes its own sanctioning or reward-and-punishment system.

First, there is legal authority and its sanctioning system. In every society, implicit and sometimes explicit judgments are made that certain norms, and sometimes certain beliefs and values, are so crucial to the social order that disconformity in these respects cannot be tolerated. It is these crucial elements of a social order that are ordinarily covered by its laws, which specify illegal actions and their punishments. Punishment for breaking a legally established norm frequently takes the form of depriving the law breaker of the rights and privileges which the society values most highly. Imprisonment, for example, now denies him freedom of action; in ancient time, banishment from one's country expressed a different but similarly valued privilege.

Akin to the legal authority of the state manifested in its laws is the authority of private bodies to formulate and enforce their rules and regulations. Thus, in any society, legal authority will be lodged within some government to which everyone is subject, but it will also be lodged in private associations—business firms, labor unions, universities—to whose authority emloyees or members are subject and which constitute in effect private governments.

Not all norms, even basic ones, are incorporated into formal laws and regulations. Societies also depend upon the force of social authority and its sanctioning system to sustain commitment. Societies differ, of course, in the relative degree to which legal and social authority are relied upon to secure adherence to the norms. The more traditional the society, probably the greater the reliance on social authority.

Social authority is no more or less than the authority of the group to exercise a degree of control over the behavior of its members. Like legal authority, social authority includes a sanctioning system—a much more informal one to be sure—through which "good" conduct and beliefs may be rewarded and "bad" conduct and beliefs punished. This is most clearly seen in the group's power to reward through acceptance and punish through rejection.

Social authority may be uni- or multi-dimensional depending upon the complexity of the society. In anything but the most primitive societies, there are usually many sources of social authority, often in conflict with one another—membership and interest groups of all kinds which are capable of imposing sanctions not only upon their own members but upon others as well.

A third type of authority is the supra-social one, which too has its accompanying sanctioning system. Here, beliefs, values, and norms derive their authority from a transcendental referent. Supra-social authority operates most clearly through institutionalized religion. Like legal and social authority, it also has the power, theoretically at least, to reward and punish. The rewards and punishments, however, are not immediately imposed but are promised for the future. To be sure, the church is capable of exercising its authority to reward or punish in the present. When it does, however, it is exercising legal rather than supra-social authority, just as the corporation may reward or punish its executives for adherence to or infraction of the rules.

There is still a fourth authority—the authority of the self as manifested in the individual conscience. It does not seem to be arbitrary to say that the individual conscience can exercise authority and is capable of rewarding and punishing. The authority it exercises is not entirely independent of legal, social, or supra-social authority, but neither are the other three entirely independent of each other. To point to self-authority is to point to the obvious fact that societies differ greatly in the extent to which they produce individuals more or less free to choose their commitments for themselves. All human beings are members of some society and all are socialized in some way or other through the force of some authority or other. When circumstances are right, genuine individuality emerges; that is to say, though external rewards and punishments are taken into account, they do not determine behavior.

In any given society, the relative saliency and influence of these various authorities and their sanctioning systems will vary. Furthermore, they will not all be relevant to every situation. Social integration is maximized, however, where different sanctioning authorities reinforce rather than contradict each other in the values, beliefs, and norms they support.

Religion and Social Integration

With these defining concepts in mind, we now wish to return to the first of our two original questions, namely, the place of religion in social integration. From what we have learned, it is evident that, if we define religion as a "sacred" or ultimate commitment to some set of norms, values, and beliefs, then religion is indeed essential to social integration. Though society is not capable of maintaining itself when it lacks a high degree of consensus as to what it is ultimately committed to, what is essential is not the kind of authority from which the commitment's "sacred" quality is derived but the simple fact that the commitment exists.

Seen in this perspective, traditional sociological theory concerning religion's contribution to social integration, though highly general does not appear to be general enough. What contributes to social integration is not institutionalized religion but what society defines as the "sacred." The reinforcement is not necessarily provided by religious ritual; it may be provided by entirely secular forms of social support. And, though the act of the "sacred" in behavior requires a sanctioning system, it does not demand that it be a supra-social one.

It follows from what has been said that institutionalized religion is not essential to social integration; theoretically, a high degree of social integration may exist without it. Where it exists, institutionalized religion may or

may not contribute in large or in small measure to social integration. Where it is in conflict with other moral authorities, it may indeed contribute to social disorganization.

How much of a contribution it makes to social integration, and the direction of that contribution, depend upon a number of factors. First of all, there is the degree to which supra-social authority is granted precedence over other forms of authority as the source and support of norms, values, and beliefs. Theoretically, if there were consensus on the primacy of the supra-social authority and its sanctioning system, institutionalized religion would play a central role in social integration.

Secondly, there is the degree to which supra-social, social, and legal authority support the same values. Where they do, the contribution of institutionalized religion to social integration is dependent on whether it informs and influences other sources of authority or is influenced and molded by them.

Thirdly, the role of transcendental authority is dependent upon the degree to which a society is ruled by tradition. Where custom and habit form the primary basis of social organization, the belief system of organized religion is likely to play an important role in rationalizing tradition. However, it must be pointed out that, insofar as institutionalized religion is tied too closely to one set of secular norms and customs, it can quickly lose its moral authority when new norms gain acceptance. When this happens, there is a propensity either to abandon traditional religious belief or to empty it of all practical application.

Fourth, organized religion's integrating role depends upon the degree of consensus which exists in the religious community itself. Where internal dissent pervades organized religion, it is not likely to contribute to the integration of the society at large, though it may heighten the cohesion of particular groups. At the same time, however, unless there is dissent, the commitment to organized religion may well be so slight as to have little influence on the value structure of the society.

In the very nature of things, religion can never serve as the exclusive basis for social integration. It can only be more or less important; there have been societies in which religious authority was dominant; we know of many today in which its role is negligible. There is good reason to believe that, where religious authority is accepted, its power to generate and sustain commitment in the face of opposition, and even of persecution, is very great. Historically, revolutionary movements have often been closely associated

with religious movements. In contemporary society, this is not the case. Yet, because they also require commitments that are difficult to carry out in practice, present-day revolutionary movements construct secular ideologies that have much of the flavor and many of the characteristics of transcendent religious belief.

Little is known as to the empirical circumstances under which religious authority gains dominance and under which its influence decays. Perhaps a crucial factor in the acceptance of religious authority is the capacity of religious institutions and their personnel to organize society, that is, to provide the institutional framework in which the on-going everyday life of a society is carried on. This happened in medieval Europe but the history of Western society is the history of the gradual spread of wholly secular institutions.

These theoretical considerations still leave open the question of the actual role of religion in influencing the value structure of particular societies. We finally turn now to a brief examination of the situation in America.

Religion and Values in Society

The basic normative structure of American society derives in large measure from the high value placed on democracy as a basis for political and social organization. At the present time, this commitment to democracy rests primarily on secular beliefs and values. It is nevertheless fair to say that the respect for human individuality which underlies democratic conviction is rooted in and has been informed by the Judaeo-Christian heritage as it has been interpreted in the light of history.

This capacity of religion to inform the secular normative structure seems to be largely a thing of the past. In a complex society, and particularly in a democratic one, contributions to the normative structure come from many sources—the body politic, the economic order, the mass media, labor unions, and private citizens, as well as the church. These sources at once inform the norms and values of our society and are informed by them. The process is a dialectical one but it is not necessarily a matter of even exchange. Any particular institution may at times be influenced by the surrounding value structure considerably more than it is able to exercise influence over it.

Organized religion in the United States, we would assert, is currently much more on the receiving than on the contributing side of the value process. This is not because of lack of opportunity to make explicit what

secular values should be, to elaborate on the implications of religious faith, to question the existing normative structure. The avenues open to the church for making a contribution are many—sermons, church periodicals and educational materials, offical pronouncements, church programs, discussion groups. The available audience is large; the majority of the population is regularly exposed to the church's influence through Sunday worship as well as in other ways. Yet, the evidence indicates that the church is not availing itself of its manifold opportunities. It is not, in fact, seeking to make explicit how men ought to behave, to what ends, and for what reasons.

This is not to say that norms and values are ignored in what the church seeks to communicate. On the contrary, they are the major themes of much that is talked and written about. But the level of abstraction at which the topic is pursued has the consequence of leaving to other sources the final say in determining everyday norms and values. The church's emphasis is overwhelmingly on man's relationship to God. The implications of the faith for man's relation to man are left largely to the individual to work out for himself, with God's help but without the help of the churches. Man is exhorted to be a "steward of God," "to exercise choice and initiative in his use of leisure time in keeping with the new life in Christ," "to manage economic wealth in terms of Christian responsibility and leadership," "to accept the political responsibilities of Christian citizenship on the basis of his citizenship in the Kingdom of God."

However well-grounded these injunctions may be theologically, and whatever symbolic or psychological functions they may serve in the lives of individuals, the result from the standpoint of influencing concrete behavior is very little. How man behaves, and what he values, is not informed by his faith but by the norms and values of the larger society of which he is a part. Confronted on the one hand by the abstract prescriptions of his faith and on the other by the concrete norms and values made explicit by law, by the context in which he labors, and by secular groups, man is almost inexorably led to follow the latter—partly because their sanctioning systems are more salient but also because the nature of a religiously inspired choice is not clear.

Dilemma of the Churches

There are good and perhaps sufficient reasons, aside from theological ones, to account for the church's failure to contribute significantly to informing present-day values. The implications of the faith are simply not clear enough to be expounded authoritatively and unequivocally. Also rele-

vant, most noticeably on the contemporary scene, is the high value which the church appears to place on harmony and the avoidance of conflict. Wherever choice is between maintaining harmony and taking a stand on an issue which would produce conflict, the church most often chooses harmony. This is seen in the way that local congregations are governed as well as in situations where the church has an opportunity to inform the general community, for example, in the recent events in Little Rock, Arkansas. What is being here spoken of is perhaps no more than another facet of the frequently commented upon "dilemma of the churches." Were the church to insist upon strict obedience to a set of norms, values, and beliefs, it would probably lose whatever power it now exercises in the larger society.

Because of this dilemma, it is unlikely that the church could succeed in generating a general commitment to its standards even were it to make explicit the behavioral and attitudinal implications of the faith. Insofar as it has made its position explicit on given issues, its constituency has not widely adopted its values, at least not in situations where there are conflicting secular norms. Witness, for example, the relative failure of the churches to foster racially integrated congregations though this is an issue on which most major denominations have spoken out in unequivocal terms.

That the church is being informed by, more than it is informing, the values of the larger society is an indicator that our society no longer appeals to supra-social authority and its sanctioning system to validate its norms. It is also a sign that organized religion is committed, implicitly at least, to maintaining the society as it is rather than to fostering its regeneration along lines formulated by the church. In this latter sense, religion is indeed making a contribution to social integration though perhaps on terms which compromise its distinctly religious character.

It is not being suggested that the contemporary church cannot inform the lives of individuals and exercise an influence on society through them. Nor can it be said that, within particular minority religious movements, supra-social authority may not still have precedence over other forms of authority. Looking at American society as a whole, however, organized religion at present is neither a prominent witness to its own value system nor a major focal point around which ultimate commitments to norms, values, and beliefs are formed.

THEOLOGY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE EN RAPPORT?

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Current interest in interdisciplinary approaches is soundly based. Truth has a basic unity. The vastness of man's knowledge, possible because of the liberality of God's revelation, requires specialization. Yet the specialist can never be sure of his ground unless he is aware of relevant findings in related fields. One of the most fruitful of these cross-field contacts involves theology and the social sciences.

Diverse and Kindred Objectives

This relationship is complicated by significant differences in interest and viewpoint among both theologians and social scientists. Also some attempted differentiations between the two fields are too facile. It is not always true, for example, that social sciences are descriptive whereas theology is normative. Theology attempts descriptions of social reality, while any science which is purposive is to that extent normative. Nor does the theologian deal only with ends while the social scientist is preoccupied with means. Theological and ethical considerations are related to means. Even in their capacities as social scientists, men accept and defend quite general goals, such as freedom or peace. Theology does not have a monopoly on commitment of life, nor is science the exclusive realm of dispassionate research. The social scientist is committed at least to truth if not also to social welfare.

A basic difference between the two disciplines lies in the ultimacy of the questions raised. Theology consciously defines its field as inclusive. It seeks to understand the meaning of the whole. It raises issues behind and beyond the more limited concerns of the social scientist. Theology, even in its varying forms, is in some fashion theistic in reference. Its judgments raise questions of ultimate values. Commitment is to a transcendent God. On the other hand, even when social science transcends a particular culture or includes values in its purview, it does not go seriously beyond the relationship of man to man or of man to nature. Whatever programs are evolved may claim acceptance on the basis of humanist goals, but not as the word of God.

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Methodologically, this involves a difference in the degree of reliance on intuition, or immediate awareness which is accepted as self-validating. As there is inevitably something of the empirical in every theology, so is there necessarily something of the intuitional in every science. The latter is true at least of those irreducible, logically primitive concepts for the support of which there can be no adequuate data. In moving from the physical to social sciences, the possibilities for observation and control become less. The transition from the social sciences to theology involves a further step toward a magnified role for intuition. One cannot put man into a test tube. Much less can he maintain telegraphic communication with God.

Theology Enriching Social Science

Both theology and social science would be enriched by intercommunication. In at least four areas theology can teach the social scientist.

One is the provision of a superior motivation for professional activity. Any project becomes of considerably greater importance if the purposes of God and the ultimate destiny of man are seen to be involved. Competence then comes to have cosmic and eternal significance. The springs of conduct are likely to become less anthropocentric and egocentric. When one sees God "high and lifted up," or when one becomes vitally aware of his eternal processes in an ever-expanding universe, a particular academic promotion or a lifetime of professional acclaim becomes trivial by comparison. More tremendous drives are response to the initiative of a gracious Father or the giving of self in gratitude to the dynamic purposes of God. Such acceptance of divine fellowship releases resources of power of which the unbeliever has no knowledge.

A second respect in which theological findings make a difference is in the gathering and analysis of data. Theology is interested in the fullest possible approximation to the totality of reality. The degree of comprehensiveness considered necessary for conclusions in the social sciences is considerably less. It is probably true that for immediate operational purposes an expansion of the scope of sociological inquiry would usually make little difference. The purpose of any study project is limited, and a research design is prepared which seems adequate to that purpose. The limitation of purpose may itself become a difficulty, however. This purpose is often not profoundly examined. Is a particular study worth making? What is its relationship to the large whole of life and reality? Until the social scientist as a religious man does ask such more ultimate questions, his work lacks full significance and validity.

If God exists, this is surely the most pervasively important fact in all reality. This perspective changes the relative significance of everything else. Man is then seen always to be creature, finite and sinful before his creator. The eternal reference involved in a theistic orientation adds an eschatological dimension to human action. The relativity which pervades much social inquiry is brought up short before an absolute factor. Men view situations from different backgrounds, and the multiplicity of unique and dynamic factors in various cultures calls for different interpretations. Yet the will of God for a particular person in a specific situation is definite and fixed. There is a standard by which one cultural element or one culture as a whole may be judged to be better than another.

To base the interpretation of society simply on human needs and wants is inadequate. There is a "metacultural" sphere. We cannot know what our human situation means without this larger context. Merely deriving prudent suggestions from an accumulation of psychological and sociological data is not a sufficient guide for conduct even within a limited set of circumstances.

Not only does theology expand the scope of inquiry, it also alters the weighing of various items of data, which is an essential step in establishing the probability of any social hypothesis. For example, in weighing economic aid to underdeveloped areas against our enjoyment of material comforts, an altruistic orientation related to an experience of the agape of God may lead to a different conclusion on the basis of the same statistics. Data are always interpreted by men with value systems. The adequacy of the value systems is an important factor in the validity of their findings.

The differences in conclusions resulting from such variation in emphasis may not be dramatically great. It is a matter of a little bit more or less, rather than all or nothing. Yet such comparatively minor differences in degree are often determinative in social decision. These are the differences which are involved in political campaigns, in framing legislation, and in the quality of community life.

This is a matter of widespread consequence. Ethical values are involved in every human choice. The science of economics is *not morally autonomous.* Technological decisions are not amoral. There is a right or wrong way to build a bridge or bake a cake or perform a surgical operation. These involve considerations like the most efficient use of means, safety, the value of life, or the relative importance of physical goods. If we remain unaware that we are actually making unexamined ethical assumptions, we are omitting an important step in the research process. If we become more consciously critical

with respect to implicit values, we may go far toward delivering contemporary man from his feelings of aimlessness and meaninglessness.

A third major contribution of theology to social science lies in underscoring the reality and consequence of freedom. The freedom of God introduces creative possibilities far beyond our power to imagine. The Holy Spirit is not bound by sociological laws. Here are potentialities for change of a unique nature and of an order of magnitude not taken seriously by the psychosocial sciences as such.

Because of the reality of human freedom, the behavioral sciences establish only probabilities. If they claim more than this, they are in error. Individuals can overcome adverse combinations of circumstances, like slum environments. Man is not completely culture-bound. He transcends the social organizations by which he is shaped. History exhibits both continuity and diversity. Against determinism, we must assert man's capacity for independent initiative and growth. To any social scientists still impressed by uninterrupted progress, we must emphasize the diabolical possibilities in human sin.

This leads to a fourth theological contribution, the necessity of commitment as a prerequisite to full insight. This is not to urge subjectivity in the sense of distortion by prejudice. This is not to discount reason, nor the analytical handling of data, nor the fullest possible safeguards against bias. It is to recognize the inevitable reality of our existing involvement and the value of existential thinking, which moves beyond analysis to personal decision.

We are knit into the fabric of social life as actors, not as spectators. Social science is never completely dispassionate. Complete detachment means misunderstanding, as anthropologists have often pointed out. The participant observer, along with his peculiar temptations, also has unique advantages. Social scientists have not always sufficiently seen this, especially when related to the study of more ultimate issues. Martin Luther exaggerated when he said, "By living, by dying, by being damned one becomes a theologian —not by understanding, reading, and speculating." If the "by . . . not" could be changed to "both by . . . and," this would constitute good advice to both theologians and social scientists.

Social Science Informing Theology

In the two-way traffic between the disciplines, theologians also need to learn from social scientists. One such lesson is the valuable methodo-

logical contribution made by the scientific approach, the disciplined use of data, and precision and restraint in expression which have characterized social science at its best. Those theologians are wrong who assert a radical discontinuity between religion and other areas of knowledge. Whatever limitations one may place upon it as a primary reliance, the empirical and rational approach is both inescapable and commendable in theology also. Discovery and revelation are opposite sides of the same coin. Neither is complete without the other.

Of course, any human knowledge is possible only because of God's initiative in self-disclosure. But any human statement about that self-disclosure must be tested; it is infected with finitude and imperfection. A truth claim cannot be made identical with truth. Witness to a faith is not sufficient, and certainly absurdity is no evidence of validity. There is a larger place for intuitional elements in theology than in science, but that place is still minimal rather than maximal. Wherever possible, intuition is to be tested by experience and reason, rather than the reverse.

In the second place, the social sciences, even within their limited field, provide a range of data which is indispensable to, though often neglected by, the theologian. It is strange that the theologian, who aims to understand the meaning of the whole, is often indifferent to that part of reality described by the social scientist. Three illustrations may be cited.

Herbert Butterfield has observed,

> During two thousand years the ecclesiastical mind in general has tended to be unfortunate in its handling of technical historical data; for it has cherished more legends than anybody else, has believed them longer than anybody else, and has attempted to maintain them by force when all argument in their favour has lost its efficacy [Herbert Butterfield, *Christianity, Diplomacy and War*, London: Epworth Press, 1953; pp. 18-19].

Recent examples are to be found in extreme skepticism about man's capacity for good and about the possibilities for social progress. Both involve a selective and therefore unscholarly reading of history. Greater sophistication in social science would suggest a less simple and more balanced conclusion.

Furthermore, the contemporary tendency to turn to the artist for insight is both a valuable device and a tricky expedient. The creative writer or painter typically has a more limited perspective than the social scientist,

who works with statistical evidence and carefully selected samples. The artist may almost by chance reflect the typical human situation. It is at least as possible, however, that he portray the deviant and the exceptional in a biased and unreliable representation—particularly since best-seller lists, like newspapers, are more congenial to "man bites dog" material. To base theology to any serious extent on this kind of portrayal is a highly dubious practice. We may well turn to the artist for illustrations or preliminary hypotheses, but not for our chief data or conclusions.

In translating the meaning of love into concrete, contemporary ethical decision, the data of the social sciences are indispensable. We need reliable knowledge about the existing situation before we can judge which available alternative will best move toward the goal projected by religious faith. Social sciences contribute important knowledge about the nature of a problem, the possible means at hand, and some significant consequences of the use of each alternative. All this is particularly essential when decisions are as complex and crucial as those faced by modern man. Just as certain activities should not be undertaken "without benefit of clergy," so conclusions on social matters should not be arrived at without benefit of sociologists.

In addition to these contributions in areas in which theologians have normally been interested, social scientists may call attention to problems about which theologians have not always been sufficiently concerned. Particularly has this neglect been ominous among laymen as they have tried to think theologically. For one thing, there is a constant temptation to define religion in only a single dimension, involving the relationship between man and God. The dimension of relationship to man is either not clearly integrated into a doctrine of salvation, or is expressed only in general terms which become largely irrelevant in practical situations, or is left such a theoretical matter as to exist alongside irresponsible apathy.

The social sciences can help churchmen become more sensitive to the changing social situations within which they must witness and serve. The full meaning of stewardship or vocation in the mid-twentieth century becomes clearer when we have at least an elementary acquaintance with the realities of power elites, status and mobility, international trade, or an economy of abundance. Missions can scarcely live up to their full promise without an awareness of the breakdown of tribal communities, urbanization, nationalism, and rapid social change.

Social scientists can also help churchmen discover the present plight of the churches with respect to such varied factors as class composition,

community barriers, power structures, or population changes. Theologians can be confronted with the perils of institutionalism and ways in which the church may be imprisoned in its own structure. Christians can be brought to appreciate the group as an important source of creativity and the possibilities in superior leadership patterns and group processes.

A Plea for Rapprochement

There are no unassailable barriers to the mutual enrichment which would result from a closer rapprochement between theology and social science. There are important current hindrances. The wave of antirationalism in theology often proves baffling or offensive to the scientifically minded, especially when it appears to be an esoteric, self-sufficient cultism. A strong psychological emphasis among those interested in human behavior now de-emphasizes the study of the group. The preoccupation of some social scientists with the trivial (so that man may yet play God in numbering the hairs of our heads) may lead them to denigrate those with broader concerns. Yet none of these are necessarily inherent in the disciplines involved. Finite man can even keep within bounds the kind of academic imperialism which tries to protect one's own reputation and dominance by underestimating the contributions of others.

A more fundamental difficulty might seem to be that religion always comes as an offense into human life. The thrust of religion is to nonconformity. The pressure of culture is to conformity. Theologians, when true to their callings, assert the judgment of God on every human act. The prophetic voice is always less popular than it is suspect. For ego-striving men, rapprochement is always more difficult with their critics.

Yet this cannot be made too simple a dichotomy. Actually the scandal of religion confronts "the wisdom of the wise," whether they be theologians or social scientists. God has a controversy with both groups. No very profound reconciliation is likely to come until both exhibit the humility of the learner, even when they may be teaching.

Several promising opportunities might be developed for fruitful conversation between theologians and social scientists. Theological school faculties ought to include members competent in such fields as sociology, psychology, or education, either as full-time appointments or consultants or participants in joint courses. The tendency to staff seminaries solely with theologians is bound to result in a weaker curriculum and in a relatively uneducated ministry. Social ethics, for example, can come of age only as it goes beyond both thin theology and amateur social science to become profoundly an interdisciplinary exploration.

Church-related colleges should seriously sponsor this kind of continuing colloquy between the department of religion and the various social sciences. The university, even if privately or state sponsored, does not discharge its full function unless it explores such relationships.

If the minister's reading is to prepare him for service in the modern world, it must include materials reflecting a social science interest. The local congregation can often become a year-round interdisciplinary seminar between minister and people. Laymen professionally engaged in the social sciences are due greater appreciation for the contribution their specializations can make in the councils of the church. They should be more frequently used as contributors to church publications, authors of curriculum materials, or leaders of conferences. Especially within the fellowship of the church, theologians and social scientists should stand as allies against the irresponsible response to life, and as colleagues in a common ministry linking the purposes of God and the needs of men.

PLUMBER OR RELIGIOUS RESEARCHER?

MANFRED STANLEY

Protestant Council of the City of New York

At a recent meeting of the Religious Research Association, one of America's leading social philosophers—with his tongue not altogether in his cheek—defined researchers as "plumbers" within the structure of organized religion. What a peculiarly appropriate metaphor to describe the reality within which so many religious researchers operate!

The analogy seems relevant on two levels: first, a plumber is usually called when the client first notices something wrong in the form of a faulty faucet or a leaky pipe and he is called in with reference to the faucet or the leak, not the whole house. Second, the plumber is a problem solver; i.e., he is expected to fix the faucet or the leak, not merely to diagnose the situation and present the facts. In both senses the role of the religious researcher clearly diverges from that of the purely academic researcher. Upon realization of this difference, some individuals choose to fall back upon the traditional role of the academic investigator and then forestall any pressure

or requests for recommendation or action involvement of any kind. An assumption underlying this paper is that the posture of withdrawal does not represent necessarily the most appropriate or helpful solution. Hence, the ensuing discussion will concern itself with the problems of those researchers who wittingly accept the responsibility of the dual role of investigator and planning consultant. Thus, as here conceived, religious research differs in its function from more academic research in the sociology, history, and philosophy of religion performed both inside and outside religious organizations.

Despite theoretical distinctions between researcher and policy maker, it is obvious that social scientists are increasingly being asked to take part in the planning process in a variety of settings. This paper deals with an administrative situation in which the research staff has been repeatedly asked by different clients to make policy recommendations only to find that relatively few of the suggestions given were actually implemented. This situation led the writer to an examination of the sociological and historical context in which the research agency was embedded. We believe that this kind of analysis is basic to an adequate understanding of the social role of the applied researcher and his link to the changes he is expected to help bring about.

Rise of a Research Agency

This paper will deal with the issues introduced above through the medium of a discussion of the administrative problems of the Department of Church Planning and Research of the Protestant Council of the City of New York. The Department represents major denominations having churches in one of the largest cities in the world; a city which is the focal point of a very rapid socio-cultural change and a repository of almost every social problem of urbanization in the twentieth century. In few places can one observe a more dramatic challenge to the fundamental adaptability and relevance for our age of organized religion. The history of this Department represents recognition on the part of member denominations that a combined resource and planning approach is a necessity in such a setting. Thus, in the "crisis context," the manner in which the research function of such a department is conceptualized by researcher and client alike is one basic index of the degree to which the concepts and perspectives of modern social science have penetrated the behavior of organized religion on the planning level. Though this paper will attempt to clarify these issues through one *case study*, it is hoped that the reader will keep in mind the larger relevance of the concepts and ideas introduced here with reference to a single agency.

The Department of Church Planning and Research of the Protestant Council of the City of New York grew out of a previous non-Council agency, the "Pathfinding Service." This service was organized by the New York City Mission Society as an interdenominational research, survey, and consultation service for Protestants in New York City and a link between the Protestant community and civic agencies. Its origin grew out of a concern for the diminishing influence of Protestantism in the city. In January 1954 the function of the Pathfinding Service was taken over by the present agency, which in itself was newly created at that time by recommendation of the Service, which had carried out an appraisal of the work of the Protestant Council as a whole.

The new Department inherited both the functions and problems of the old, For one thing, the new Department was asked not only to continue the consultation and liaison work, but to provide the demographic-ecological surveys of the city which the Service had not had the time or resources to carry out. A second problem grew out of the fact that denominational executives were increasingly asking for guidance concerning actual administrative problems of implementation and priorities. This latter tendency, as will be seen, created a need for a kind of research which goes far beyond the simple demographic-ecological survey work to which the Department largely confined itself from its inception in 1954 to about 1957, with two exceptions. (A larger-scale research and planning effort was embodied in a $27,000,000 city-wide projected strategy which included provisions for new churches, staffing, etc. See *Twentieth Century Opportunity*, 1956. To date, $18,000,000 has been underwritten toward this plan. Another attempt at city-wide planning was a survey of the Puerto Rican situation, *Midcentury Pioneers and Protestants*, 1954.)

Inadequate Research Services

At this point, in order to return to the central issues of this paper, it becomes necessary to depart from the foregoing historical account in order to examine the particular conceptualization of research which underlay these years of activity. The point will be made that, in the light of continuing pressure from denominations for recommendations and interpretation in addition to simple information, a new conceptualization of research becomes necessary, and, because of this, a new administrative relationship between researcher and client as well. The problems to be discussed below are outgrowths of the juxtaposition of two historical factors: First, for various ideological and historical reasons scientific research and concepts came only recently to be considered relevant to religious interests and concerns; and, second, due to the historical development of Protestantism in

separate administrative units, the lack of administrative experience in co-operative planning results in a strong dependence upon the initiative and imagination of non-denominational agencies. This pressure for initiative and guidance was present in the experience of the Pathfinding Service and is emerging again in the research-client relationship in the case of the present Department.

The need for and emergence of the demographic-ecological research phase partially covered over for a time the deeper problems of interpretation and recommendations. Rephrasing this in terms of research-client relationships, the problem which the client denominations brought to this Department was essentially the desire for basic information about the city, its people, and its facilities. Essentially, this kind of research is one which can be summed up, at the cost of some degree of oversimplification, in the term *"client-defined problem research."* This kind of research is directed at answering specific questions posed by the client, and it does not depart from the question as conceptualized by the client. It is research which usually involves simple fact-gathering without assumptions inherent in it which might threaten the client's ideology (e.g., by introducing assumptions about human motivations and social institutions which might go counter to the client's view of the situation) or force the research process too far from the client's specific expressed focus of concern. Figure A illustrates in diagrammatic form a model of the administrative relationship between researcher and client appropriate to this form of research.

FIGURE A

Questions Asked ⟶

Client   *Researcher*

⟵ Information Provided

The formal structure of this relationship is one in which a client (in the form of an individual or agency) poses a specific question to a researcher (individual or agency) and receives an answer (information) in return. These two statuses (viewed in the Parsonian sense, e.g., status-role occupant) of client and researcher are not necessarily linked in any more embracing formal relationship than the question-answer link here illustrated. (It should be pointed out at this juncture that this description refers to a model, which by definition over-simplifies reality. The function of a model is pragmatic; e.g., although over-simplified, it must contain enough of reality within it that the over-simplification becomes of positive value in allowing comparisons between situations via models of these situations. Further-

more, these models should be taken as polar ends of a continuum, rather than as purely discrete occurrences.) There is no formal structural basis for an ongoing relationship between researcher and client which would allow for deeper research beyond the client's view of his own problem, nor is it appropriate for long-range recommendations, for reasons presently to be discussed.

As the need for simple information on the city gradually became somewhat alleviated through the demographic-ecological investigations of the Department (although the need is ever-present and this kind of work will continue indefinitely), further pressures for broader interpretation and initiative made themselves felt again. This was manifested in requests for research which allowed a wide latitude for the Department in defining the research issues; in request for interpretation of the implications of the information; and, above all, in the request for recommendations as to how the client could implement the research results. With the request for recommendations, a considerably different conception of research and the researcher-client relationship becomes necessary.

Why Churches Need Research

In order to understand the kinds of problems faced by denominational clients which would bring them to the point of requesting recommendations, and to comprehend the total context of those problems, the Department staff analyzed its experiences and its research results to date. The staff came to see the relevance of the following problems and issues which can be said to underlie the need for deeper kinds of research.

1. Emerging conflicts for city churches between special interests such as ethnic, class, and theological orientations, and areas of need in urban society calling for some response from the churches.

2. Decline of influence of many individual congregational-oriented churches in an increasingly organized urban milieu in which organized religious competition is a major factor.

3. Financial problems involved in supporting and staffing modern urban churches and church programs.

4. General value problems underlying administrative decisions of the future on the part of the synods for which hardly any empirical data exist regarding the nature of local churches, local opinions, class and nationality-affiliated attitudes, power systems, etc. Some of these value problems in-

volve issues such as: "church-environment relatedness; nature of Christian witness in the city through activities other than services to church members; and relationships and cooperation between churches, and between churches and community and city agencies. These issues will affect conscious policy decisions along a wide range including: evangelism techniques and appeals, choice of leadership, roles of laity, types of synodical assistance to local congregations, financial allocation, and bureaucratic structure.

A New Pattern of Research

The staff came to the conclusion that a new type of research was required which would deal with the total reality situation within which the client denominations must make their decisions. If recommendations were to become an inherent part of the research service, it became clear that a new formal relationship between client and researcher was necessary as well as a different kind of research. This new type of research can be called "researcher-defined contextual research." This term is not meant to suggest that the researcher has full freedom in defining the problem and that the client has no prerogative. All service oriented research begins with a client's expressed problem. But what this new research does is to *translate the client's problem into the larger context* of existing scientific conceptualization of human behavior and social organization within which the client and his problem are fitted. Only within this context can recommendations be made, tested, and revised. From the perspective of this kind of applied research, certain criticisms of the researcher-client relationship model described in Figure A become relevant.

The old model involves a misunderstanding of the nature of the research process. It assumes that research involves examination, from the outside, of a situation which is static—frozen at a particular point in time. It also assumes that the client's social context is not itself altered by the research process but that research recommendations can be simply "fed into" the administrative system from the outside and that the system will respond appropriately. Because of these false assumptions of the nature of research, the old model does not provide a structured situation in which feedback and resultant self-correction can occur for both research and administration. The result is that, under the old model, research recommendations tend to be molded by the problem as it is defined almost exclusively by the client. But recommendations which do not take into account the structure, methods, and implications of implementation and the changes these are likely to entail for the client system are impractical.

FIGURE B

CLIENT (⟵——— Problems Discussed ———⟶) RESEARCH
.... ( ) ....
... *Client* (⟵——— Recommendations Given) *Researcher* ...
.... ( ) ....
SYSTEM (Feedback Reactions ————⟶) SYSTEM

Figure B represents a model of the researcher-client relationship which attempts to take account of the demands of the long-range research-planning goal. This model begins with the recognition that both researcher and client are individual statuses which are themselves embedded in systems of statuses. These systems must be formally taken account of in both research and administration if there is to be any possibility of feedback of information and subsequent correction processes. This model can be applied to the agency which is the subject of this paper. The researcher status here is occupied by the Department of Church Planning and Research, an dthe "Research System" is the Protestant Council of the City of New York. A typical occupant of the client status is a department of the urban church of Denomination X. The Client System is the national denomination at large, with its departments, administrators, and local churches. (Because the Protestant Council is a local organization, one could perhaps more accurately say that the Client System is the local organization of the denomination, but, to the degree that it is controlled by the national level, the latter cannot be left out of consideration.) It would be logically legitimate to raise this model one step higher on the ladder of abstraction and conceptualize the client status occupant as any department of the denomination as a whole. The research status occupant then would become the research unit of any local protestant council or else the research unit of the National Council of the Churches of Christ, since this organization is a functional equivalent on the national level of the local protestant councils.

Aims, Assumptions, Dangers

Inherent in this model of partially integrated relationships are certain aims, assumptions, and dangers. The major aim here is to provide a formally structured relationship which will legitimate gathering sufficient knowledge of the Client System to allow the researcher to interpret the client's expressed problem within a broader context of social structure and administration. This context must be part of the subject of research so that recommendations can take account of the implementation process by pre-

dicting some of the further problems which will arise and the manner in which they could be handled. For this to be possible, a "feedback" process must be builtin which will remove the static nature of the old model represented in Figure A and allow for the observation of change over time as recommendations are implemented.

Concerning the agency example used in this paper, one characteristic of many of the client denominations is the existence of some degree of ambiguity in the amount of denominational authority over local churches which exists as a basis for the implementation of certain kinds of recommendations. Many denominational executives are close to a state of experimentation when it comes to the assumption of prerogative in some areas of decision-making. This situation necessitates building into the research process an investigation of the relationship between the denomination and its local churches both in terms of patterns of cooperation and areas of tension. Thus, the final recommendations of such a study would include some suggestions having to do with substantive policy, and others relevant to the administrative implementation of these suggestions in the light of the total context. In making these recommendations, the researcher must be aware of his own social system as well so that he may understand the limits, advantages, and implications of his recommendations in the light of his own social identity. Some denominational executives may conceivably be prepared to accept results from researchers in a protestant council context which they might reject from researchers in a university setting. Furthermore, those in the Research System who exert budgetary and other kinds of authority over the research department could have a different conception of the research function than does the staff. If so, it is conceivable that, despite profoundly harmonious relations between researcher and client, the department's failure to educate its own social system concerning the function of research in the outside environment may bring about the department's demise through lack of authoritative support in appropriate and needed budget and staffing.

Next, let us consider the matter of assumptions. As neither the researcher nor the client operates in a vacuum, some integration of the structural contexts is necessary. The researcher requires some involvement and participation in the Client System if he is to understand the problems of day-by-day administration and implementation. At the same time, this involvement of researcher and research process in the Client System is necessary for the administrator so that research recommendations will not come as traumatic shocks against a rigid system unprepared for change.

Again in our agency example, the Department of Church Planning and Research is comprised (aside from professional staff) of denominational representatives, some of whom are of executive status. Appointed by their respective denominations, these representatives make decisions concerning the activities of the Department. Thus, the denominations they represent are "members" of the Department, and the Department is responsible to the member denominations through these representatives. This system was initially designed to establish clearly lines of responsibility and accountability between the Department and the denominations, rather than to provide a structured integration of the research process into denominational life. Thus, while admirably fulfilling the former goal, the present arrangement represents a rather rudimentary level of such integration of the research process. Representatives are not appointed with necessary reference to their strategic position in the decision-making and planning process of their denominations, nor is their role in the Department deliberately correlated with those activities in their denominations which are potentially relevant to implementation of Department policy recommendations.

One danger is that the researcher becomes party to structural and psychological tensions within the Client System. Thus, as has happened to some extent in industrial sociology, the researcher can conceivably become identified as a "tool of management" or some similar categorization vis-a-vis, for instance, the local churches. This Department has yet to do a study of any denomination on the level of thoroughness with which it has carried out studies of local churches for the denominations. Aside from the issue of research requirements such as this paper has been discussing, if this pattern of selective research continues indefinitely, it is quite possible that the Department could lose a good deal of the reputation for impartiality on the local level which enables it to carry out its investigations smoothly. Moreover, if too great an integration between the researcher and the Client System occurs, the researcher can develop "vested interests," unhealthy dependency patterns, "blind spots," or other variations of interference with objectivity.

Two general safeguards are called for if the researcher-client relationship expressed in Figure B is to be successfully implemented: First, integration of the Research and Client Systems should preferably never be total, but should proceed only to that degree necessary for the effective execution of research. The magnitude of this integration cannot be explicitly stated beforehand, but is a matter of circumstance, personalities,

and judgment. The Department has experimented with different techniques of research presentation to see if any of them significantly affects the degree of integration. One of the most successful of such techniques involved the restriction of presentation to an oral rather than a written level. This brought about a gradualness of presentation and a closeness of contact between researcher and client which came closest to the situation described in Figure B. However, experience has not been sufficiently extensive for a Department policy on this issue to crystallize. Second, all parties in the Client System should be made to understand the role of the researcher as he himself conceives it. Thus, certain limits to research plus patterns of confidentiality appropriate to the situation should be worked out before the final report is completed and perhaps even before the methodology is designed. Agreements in these areas should be communicated to all concerned.

Recapitulation and Summary

This paper has attempted to discuss intervention in applied social research through a case study of an agency wherein the researcher functions as a planning consultant as well. Failure on the part of some clients to implement policy recommendations served as an impetus for a sociological analysis of the agency's role. Several conclusions were drawn which the writer believes are relevant to the area of applied social science and planning generally.

1. The applied researcher, in somewhat facetious analogy to a plumber, is a person who must reconcile his role of problem-solver with that of expert. A problem arises if the client's conception of his problem differs from that of the expert's, and—as in the case of the plumber—the time-and-cost estimate of what it will take to diagnose the true problem and its alleviation differs commensurately.

2. It was suggested through the case study of one agency that the introduction of modern social research into an area of social life (in this case organized religion) proceeds according to *phases*. In the initial stage the client approaches the researcher with a request for simple information which, in the client's view, will help him with a specific problem. At this point the client-researcher relationship is dominated largely by the client's own expressed definition and no conception of his problem (Figure A). Gradually, unless there are ideological impediments to the process, the client comes to view his own situation more in terms of the concepts and methods of modern social science theory as represented by the researcher. As this

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occurs, the research process becomes more deeply involved in the client's structure of administration and implementation (Figure B).

3. Thus, as the client's conception of research and his relation to it undergoes change and development, the respective administrative contexts within which both the researcher and the client operate must be adjusted accordingly. This adjustment must proceed in the direction of a more long-term formal relationship between the two administrative structures so that research recommendations can be tested and the results fed back into the research process in the interests of greater accuracy. If this deeper administrative relationship between client and researcher is not formally provided for, research results may fail to speak to the fundamentals of the client's problem, and the recommendations made will tend to be impractical.

4. Finally, certain issues of propriety in research were discussed, such as limitations to investigation and patterns of confidentiality. It was pointed out that these are important not only as moral issues but as prerequisites to public recognition and acceptance of the validity of the research function in daily affairs.

The case material itself raises many side issues of great interest, such as the general historical and philosophical significance of the institutionalization of scientific research and of concepts in organized religion. This in itself offers a most fruitful field of research not only in organization theory but in the general history of ideas.

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DECISION MAKING IN A SECT

CALVIN REDEKOP

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This paper reports on the decision-making process in a typical sect. This sect is the Old Colony Mennonite Church, which has settlements in four of the Canadian provinces, Mexico, and British Honduras. This research was made possible by a grant from the Area Research Center of Michigan State University, headed by Professor Charles P. Loomis.

A considerable amount of contemporary research focuses on the sect. Some of the research effort is directed toward understanding the dynamics of the sect (cf. writings of Yinger, Liston Pope, Harold Pfautz, and S. D. Clark), while other scientists are attempting to achieve a clearer conceptualization of what has been historically termed the sect (cf., for example, Bryan Wilson, "An Analysis of Sect Development," *American Journal of Sociology*, February, 1959; Benton Johnson, "A Critical Appraisal of Church-Sect Typology," *American Sociological Review*, February, 1957; Elmer Clark, *The Small Sects in America*, New York, 1949; and the classic conceptualizations of Ernst Troeltsch, H. R. Niebuhr, and Howard Becker). This paper deals with one aspect of the dynamic life of a sect.

A Black-and-White World

Since the materials concerning decision making in this paper are based on a reconceptualization of the sect, it is necessary to discuss briefly the chief elements. The sect is a unique religious system which has emerged and persists on the basis of a cognitive orientation which involves the perception of reality as a dichotomy—a black-and-white world. In the sect, all ideas, acts, and things are subsumed under two rubrics, namely, the holy and the unholy, or, in common language, the desirable and the undesirable (cf. views of Emile Durkheim). Schematically, the orientation looks as follows:

HOLY	(desirable)
UNHOLY	(undesirable)

This cognitive orientation operates on a collective or group and individual level. Accordingly, whether the issue involves the sect as a whole, or only individuals, the cognitive orientation remains the same. The dichotomic perception of reality differs from the cognitive orientation of other types of religious groups. As religious groups diverge more from the sectarian type, they will tend more and more to have a trichotomous orientation of reality, in which a major area of experience is ambiguous and undefined. This shading off from the sect to other types of religious aggregates looks somewhat as follows:

Sect   Non-Sect

Desirable

Ambiguous

Undesirable

It will be noted that this conceptualization differs quite radically from the traditional understanding of the sect. The above conceptualization is less limited than others inasmuch as it allows for considerable deviation in organization or behavior but still accounts for most of those groups which have been classed as sects by most writers. (Cf., for example, Harold Pfautz, "The Sociology of Secularization: Religious Groups," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 61, who uses a five-fold table of variations in sectarian organization and life.)

Theory of Decision Making

On the basis of the theoretical orientation above, a theory of sectarian decision making can be made at this point. Decision making is a complex and burgeoning topic. It is not possible here to develop the topic, for the knowledge about decision making is diverse and incomplete. (Cf. Paul Wasserman and Fred S. Silander, *Decision Making: An Annotated Bibliography*, Cornell University, 1958.) However, a few basic elements enter into every decision and can be stated. They include: a system of ultimate objectives, some obstacles to the achieving of the objectives, selection of possible alternative courses to the objectives, evaluation of the alternatives as to their consequences relative to reaching the goals. (Cf. Herbert Simon, *A Theory of Administrative Behavior*, Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, 1943.)

Underlying most decision-making theories is the assumption that there is a hierarchy of goals, and that decision making will be consistent, i.e., decisions will all contribute to predetermined goals. Decision-making theory tends to favor a rationalistic or voluntaristic interpretation of human behavior, i.e., cognition creates values which form the basis for action.

In the sect, decisions are made on the basis of a voluntaristic view of the world. (See Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber Essays in Sociology*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1946, p. 293 *passim*.) Ideas come prior to acts. Dogma precedes practice. That is, B follows naturally from

A because of a belief in the fact that a transcendental truth exists, regardless of any present complications. The existential dimension (that which makes every situation unique) does not enter in. Every segment of conscious perception can be classified into two realms: that which is to be done or embraced, and that which is not done and shunned.

Four Bases of Sectarian Decisions

The cognitive orientation which I submit exists in sectarian groups is the subterranean foundation for all specific decision making. In the present section of this paper, some specific decisions will be discussed which suggest four dimensions of the decision-making process in sectarian groups. From here on the paper draws heavily upon data obtained through personal interviews with Old Colony members in Hochfeld during the period June-November 1958.

First, the Principle of Shock Insulation. The relationship between the sect (the holy people) and the world (the unholy world) requires constant surveillance and decision making so that the relationship will not change to the detriment of the sect. The principle that operates in deciding what the relationship shall be, has been termed by the writer "shock insulation." This principle might be paraphrased as follows: "It is safer to interact with people very different from us than to interact with those quite similar, for, if we are too much alike, there is greater danger of assimilation."

The Old Colony underwent a large exodus from Manitoba to Mexico. The reasons given by numerous informants were as follows:

> Our children were learning the English language too rapidly. They were mixing too much with the English people. The government was beginning to require schools according to their standards. In Mexico there would be much less danger of assimilation, for the religion is Catholic, the language Spanish, and the culture so much different that there seemed little threat to our way of life.

An incident which occurred while the writer was in the colonies further illustrates the principle. In the summer of 1958, Mexico experienced major flood disasters. The Mexican government appealed to the Mennonite colonies for help. It was decided at the meeting of the bishops and ministers that help should be given. Thereupon a message was sent to all the villages for pledges of money. A meeting called by the *schult* (mayor) was held in each village. The decision was made to give a certain sum, and

that, rather than giving it directly to the government, they would give it to the Red Cross, which could be trusted. At the meeting in the village of Hochfeld, the writer asked why they never gave any aid through the Mennonite Central Committee, the over-all relief agency for the Mennonite groups, rather than giving to secular agencies. The reply was in essence:

> There are no strings attached to giving through the Red Cross. In working with the MCC we might become involved, since we are never sure the MCC is not trying to influence or missionize us.

Illustrations of the principle of shock insulation on the individual level are numerous. One example involves an Old Colony member who was rather successful. He went into partnership with several men from a more progressive Mennonite group by buying part interest in a well-drilling outfit. The accusation was often hurled at him that he was losing his loyalty to the Old Colony and probably would join the other group. However, at the same time there are numerous instances of partnerships between Old Colony members and Mexicans, and these evoke no criticism. One of the ministers is in partnership with some Mexicans in an implement importing business. Many other cases could be supplied.

Second, the Principle of Efficiency. Decisions relating to many areas of sectarian life are based on the premise that that course of action is best which conflicts least with the previous decisions and which costs the least amount of energy to decide. Underlying the general principle here again is the dichotomy. It goes without saying that no decision could be made which would undermine either the dichotomy or challenge a previous allocation of some entity into either of the two realms. Since the cognitive mapping of the world of experience is clear, it follows that efficiency is likely to result, for why make a thing difficult when it has already been made clear how this thing is to be apprehended. Psychological and social tension management is obviously enhanced when the principle of efficiency operates.

Several incidents illustrate: Birth control is rigidly forbidden in the Old Colony. Several Mexican doctors have indicated that they have had cases where another pregnancy would have jeopardized the mother's life. In interviewing several of these families the writer discovered that they had gone to the bishop asking for permission to practice contraception. In each case, the bishop vehemently condemned the idea, stating, "The issues are already decided in the Bible. It is clearly sin. Better for the mother to die than to commit such a heinous sin." It is clear that it is most efficient

from every angle to decide as the bishop did. Any closer look at such a problem would produce tension, unrest, disruption, and probably chaos.

Another occurrence with far-reaching consequences was: the Segura Social affair. The Segura Social is the public health program which the Mexican government is trying to make available to all Mexican citizens. When the government approached the Old Colony several years ago, it resoundingly rejected the plea for cooperation or assistance. The response included a written statement signed by the *vorsteher* of all the Colonies. Among the arguments given are the following:

> Segura Social interfered with the discharging of our religious beliefs. The Old Colony has always taken care of its needy and would continue to do so. If the Old Colony needs any help we will call on God, who has always helped us in the past. It would mean a change in the administration of the colonies, and the present system is very satisfactory.

Several organizational procedures emerge under the efficiency principle which ought to be mentioned. They are:

a) The development of experts or a hierarchy. The logic is as follows: since the basic principles are clear, let those who are most familiar make the decisions.

b) The development of authoritarian procedures. It is much easier to hand down an interpretation by the experts than to involve all those interested members.

c) The development of precedence. It is easier to decide on a pressing issue on the basis of what has been done in the past than to look at a problem on the basis of its unique elements.

Thus, it is clear that a closer existential examination or re-examination of an issue would cost time, money, energy, psychological and social harmony, and might create disruption. Further, once a problem is scrutinized in its own right, the a priori cognitive orientation is suspect. It is therefore much easier to say: a) "The basic issues are clean"; b) "We have always done it this way"; c) "Let the experts decide."

Third, the Principle of the Camel's Nose in the Tent. Many of the decisions facing the Old Colony are quite basic, relating to the major dichotomy of the world. The need to make decisions on this level comes

from forces beyond its control. For example, steel wheels have been prescribed for all tractors, for this guarantees that the tractors will not become vehicles with which the young people can tear off to town. But the dry summers, which make the soil hard as rock, and the many stones in the field have continually brought the question of rubber tires on tractors to the fore. Finally, after much energy spent in deliberation (for the principle of efficiency was voided by external forces), it was decided that rubber could be used on the front wheels.

It will be maintained by some that this was a purely arbitrary decision. But is it? Even though a decision on any one element seems arbitrary, when taken in configuration, the decisions indicate a progression. The Old Colony people agree that to have or not to have rubber on the front wheels of a tractor is arbitrary and academic, but they say, "We have to stop somewhere, so it might as well be here."

In the sect, the cognitive orientation lays down the axiom, KEEP SEPARATE FROM THE WORLD. But what relevance do rubber tires on the front of a tractor have to separation? When is the camel in the tent? When his hump is in? To this "academic" question the sects say, keep him out entirely, and, if that is impossible, be aware that every part of his anatomy that slips in makes his total presence in the tent more probable.

Fourth, the Principle of Perpetuation. Many of the Old Colony decisions are motivated by the need to perpetuate its own way or mode of life. Change is seen as disruptive and a betrayal of the "faith of the fathers." For example, farming is considered the only way of life commensurate with the Old Colony belief system. A bishop, lamenting the breakdown of the farm as an isolation mechanism said,

> There is much contact with the Mexicans which is not healthy. The Mexicans are especially aggressive sexually, and our young people are taking advantage of this. God will punish us for not remaining pure from the world. Just as the children of Israel were punished when they mixed and intermarried with the world, so God will punish us for being impure and immoral.

The sanctions invoked to keep young people in the church are very strong. If a youth goes to work in the town, he is dealt with, and excommunicated if he persists. The tendency to engage in other means of livelihood than farming is discouraged.

The principle of perpetuation is thus in a sense the culmination of the cognitive orientation presented at the outset. That is, if it is believed that a final explanation of the perceived world can be made, and if it is further believed that this explanation has been made, then it follows that the only obligation for life is to stay true to that explanation. In the words of the old bishop, "We are forsaking the idea of being a separate people, and we will be punished *if we do not return.*"

Concluding Comments

The decision-making theory presented above is based on two assumptions that need to be mentioned but which cannot be developed.

1) The development of the dichotomy. The dichotomy exists, but how did it get started? Closely related is the theory of the motivation for human action. The above theory assumes a predominantly voluntaristic theory of action. How valid is this?

2) The emergence and transformation of the sect. It is clear that an image is necessary for the emergence of a sect. How does this image emerge? It is also clear that the Old Colony image is changing. How does this image change?

In conclusion, the sect has been presented as a particular world view. A decision-making process has been submitted which supports this idea. Some decisions have been discussed. In summary, decisions in a sect take the following character: 1) The sect will probably decide many of its relationships with other people and groups on the "shock insulation" principle. 2) The sect members will probably make their day-by-day decisions on the principle of efficiency. This will produce a social structure involving authority figures, a hierarchy, and rule by precedence. 3) Many decisions are arbitrary but involve the principle of keeping the camel's nose out of the tent, else the tent will resemble the camel. 4) Many, if not all, of the decisions are anchored on the principle of perpetuation, for if a valid world view has been achieved, all that remains is to fit each day's activities into the master plan. A statement made by a very perceptive Old Colony member serves as a fitting conclusion. It speaks to the cognitive orientation and the decision-making process.

> This raises a problem which I am still at sea with. There are some things about which the Bible makes categorical and definite statements, but there are many things which are no longer black or white. These things need to be interpreted in context.

This man was moving away from the sectarian world view.

The Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr. By H. Gordon Harland. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960. 298 pp., $6.00.

Professor Gordon Harland of Drew University has written the most authoritative, comprehensive, and penetrating analysis of Reinhold Niebuhr's thought. It is authoritative because of Harland's sovereignty in treating his subject, comprehensive because it explores every aspect of Niebuhr's thinking, and penetrating because it probes to the center of his philosophy, theology, and social thinking. This is the work of a powerful younger mind engaging the profoundest insights of a towering senior scholar whose equal may not enrich western thought again for several generations.

On the basic issues—Niebuhr's conception of the norm of love, of love and justice, history, a responsible society, politics, war, economics and race—Harland's analysis is unswervingly faithful to his subject and to the complexity and richness of the Niebuhrian position. Unlike the trivial sophistry of some recent reviewers, the author honestly sets out to discover Niebuhr's intention.

For anyone who would explore the manifold dimensions of Niebuhr's thought, Harland's study will be a text for years to come. No other writer has disposed of the popular oversimplifications of Niebuhr's thought with such finality: the charges that Niebuhr is obsessed with sin, ignores the relation between sacrificial and mutual love, achieves political wisdom without any dependence on the centrality of Christology, and is paralyzed in suggesting practical courses of action because of his stress on ambiguity, dilemmas, and paradox. Harland responds to each of these charges and demonstrates that on issue after issue Niebuhr plainly sets forth directives for policy and action while recognizing the ambiguity of action.

Yet faithful textual analysis and consistent understanding of Niebuhr's specific views would be impossible unless the author had a firm grasp of Niebuhr's overarching purpose. Because Harland comprehends Niebuhr's central concern, he has produced a classic analysis and interpretation. This concern is "to relate redemptively Christian faith and social responsibility, agape and the struggle for social justice." Western culture is perplexed and bewildered, confused and misled primarily because our contemporaries ignore this relational and dialectical dimension. Christians are content to talk of agape and tough-minded secularists speak only of "the necessity, demand, and conditions for securing social justice." Harland with Niebuhr unflinchingly accepts the fact that the Christian realist must see these

two forces as they interrelate with one another. Social scientists would do well to turn to this book for a deeper awareness of the human situation.

Kenneth W. Thompson, The Rockefeller Foundation

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The Social Sources of Church Unity. By Robert Lee. New York: Abingdon Press, 1960. 238 pp., $4.50.

In this study Professor Robert Lee of Union Theological Seminary in New York seeks to "re-apply the insight" of H. Richard Niebuhr's *Social Sources of Denominationalism*. While Niebuhr's well-known book documented separateness, Lee states that the "focus of the present study is on church unity." In the book the term "church unity" is used broadly, and organic union is regarded as "but one of the many institutional manifestations of unity considered. . . ."

The study is offered as a "partial interpretation." But it is concluded that "when man's reckoning has ground to a halt, we are left facing the sheer givenness of the fact of the dawning of the church unity movement in American Protestantism." Also, writes Lee, "the signs of unity, by any reasonable test, are quite remarkable."

In American society the author finds evidence of reductions in social differences and signs of growing cultural unity. He quotes with approval his colleague, John A. Hutchison, who once wrote a history of the Federal Council of Churches, that "city life," combined with technology and secularism, "forced" cooperation and federation on the churches.

Within the religious bodies themselves, Lee finds "close harmony in thought and practice," and a liberal sharing among the major groups in American Protestantism. He thinks that a "common-core" Protestantism is emerging, including a "doctrinal consensus."

Among the developments documented, covering some 60 years, are the rise of the Federal and National Councils of Churches, the various mergers of denominations, the spread of state and local councils of churches, and community-centered churches.

Countervailing movements are considered, including the growth, intensification, and specialization of the organizational machinery of the denominations, and sectarianism and fundamentalism. The Southern Baptist Convention receives a separate section among the countervailing forces. But to Lee, the negative cases tended more to confirm than to deny his main thesis: Religious forces are converging with numerous social forces "to produce a very imposing movement of church unity."

This reviewer could, after forty years of labor in the ecumenical vineyard, respectfully file an exception to this well-written book in the form of

a statement of experience as a participant observer. Lee's colleague, John W. Bachman, writes in his recent book, *The Church in the World of Radio-Television,* that it is still easier to raise a million dollars for a denominational than for an interdenominational project in radio or television. In which denomination is cooperation a matter of first importance? How generally authentic is participation in the now large cooperative machinery? If there is an imposing movement for church unity, why do we still have the colonial pattern of church organization in rural communities? Why have we been unable to achieve effective cooperative church planning in the inner cities? Why have the comity processes affected only a few situations in city and country?

Benson Y. Landis, National Council of Churches

Christianity and Communism Today. By John C. Bennett. New York: Association Press, 1960. 188 pp., $3.50.

Christianity and Communism Today is a revision and an up-dating of *Christianity and Communism,* Dr. Bennett's valuable study pubished in 1948, which enjoyed many printings. Some of the chapters, such as "The Nature of Communism," "The Main Issues Between Christianity and Communism," and "Christianity and the Major Alternatives to Communism," remain substantially unchanged from the original edition. Elsewhere, however, important developments of the past twelve years are analyzed thoroughly. Aprroximately one-third of the material in *Christianity and Communism Today* is totally new.

In his introduction, Bennett notes four major changes that have occurred since 1948: the rise of a new generation which except for China, is "not attracted by high-flown ideologies of any kind"; the shift of emphasis from Europe to Asia; the emergence of Titoism as an experiment in national communism; and modifications and innovations in the post-Stalin Soviet Union. An important chapter is devoted to "The Significance of Developments in Russia Since Stalin." There are bright signs: the broadening of the political base of the dictatorship, a new concern for the living standards of the people and the passing from the scene of most old-line revolutionaries. But such ominous characteristics of communism still persist as tyranny and injustices during the formative period (as in China now), the continual attempt of the Communists to extend their influence and control over other nations, and the unyielding antipathy of communism toward religion. "The antireligious side of Communist teaching may be disguised or soft-pedaled during the early stages of Communist propaganda or penetration in a country," Bennett warns, "but Christians

in all countries which are in any degree tempted by communism should
not allow themselves to forget that the opposition of communism to re-
ligion is not peripheral."

In view of the collapse of the summit conference in May, Bennett's
discussion of coexistence is of particular relevance at the moment. He
shows considerable understanding of, and sympathy for, those exiles from
Communist-controlled countries and others who genuinely fear that efforts
to reach a *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union stem from American naiveté
and will lead inevitably to Western complacency and then defeat. Bennett
contends, however, that "any tolerable future that we can now foresee
depends upon critical and competitive, but also partly cooperative, co-
existence with the Soviet Union." To insist on keeping old wounds open
perpetually "for moral reasons" would lead to "the most morally destruc-
tive disasters."

In his quest for world peace and justice, Bennett will appear to some
as "too soft" on the Communist issue. To others, especially abroad, his
recapitulation of the Soviet Union's record of tyranny and his recitation
of its present weaknesses will seem like unnecessary "red-baiting"—doubt-
less the influence of American propaganda. Most readers, however, will
recognize this careful, cool-headed study of Christianity and communism
today as another of its author's many admirable contributions toward the
clarification of the complex political realities in our bewildering times.

Ralph Lord Roy, Mills College and Fund for the Republic

American Catholics: A Protestant-Jewish View. By Stringfellow Barr,
Robert McAfee Brown, Arthur Cohen, Arthur Gilbert, Martin Marty, and
Allyn Robinson. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1959. 235 pp., $3.75.

This collection of straightforward essays, at times penetrating and
always charitable, deserves a careful reading by Catholic and non-Catholic
alike. For the non-Catholic they serve as models of effective appraisals
of American Catholicism across religious lines in terms of what Father
Gustave Weigel, S. J., calls "kindly but critical analysis." For the Catholic
they tend to generate a constructive and sympathetic response to the
legitimate points made. That this sort of response has been forthcoming
rather generally from Catholic reviewers and readers in the few months
since the publication of the book would appear to validate the efficacy of
the method used and register a point in favor of the increasing maturity
of the American Catholic community.

The variety of approaches and assumptions inevitable in a collection
of this kind actually provides helpful cultural, theological, and historical

dimensions. A delightfully written essay by Stringfellow Barr on "American Catholics and Their Intellectual Heritage" opens the dialogue. His is a stimulating appeal to revive the process of dialectic both within the Catholic community and between Catholics and non-Catholics. Relevant historical perspective is supplied in Martin E. Marty's "A Dialogue of Histories." The most theologically centered of the six essays, Arthur A. Cohen's "The Natural and the Supernatural Jew: Two Views of the Church," keeps the reader mindful of the profound differences between Judaism and Catholicism, or better, between Christianity and Judaism.

For those whose primary or professional concern might be more closely allied to the sociology of religion, three additional essays will be of real interest. The advantages of a problematic approach to theoretical or practical aspects of the current interreligious situation is ably demonstrated in Robert McAfee Brown's "The Issues Which Divide Us." Rabbi Arthur Gilbert and Dr. Allyn Robinson complement this presentation from a practitioner's viewpoint which, by the very nature of the case, is community centered. Their essays suggest valuable and productive areas for undertaking or securing some of the empirically validated research in interreligious relations of which there is such a great paucity today. Rabbi Gilbert not only provides a valuable outline of psychological and sociological factors involved in the attitudes and practices of Jews in their relation to Catholics but very generously sets forth specific areas where he feels Jews can learn from their Catholic neighbors. Dr. Robinson, in his appraisal of "Catholics in the Community," opens up for examination that aspect of cultural pluralism most difficult to cope with, the religious dimension. Although a plea for religious liberty, the essay does not shirk setting forth the barriers to building bridges of understanding across religious lines.

Religious pluralism is a fact of life in twentieth century America. Books of this kind are going to be needed with more frequency if we are to stimulate, encourage, and make clear the kinds of attitudes and practices citizens must demonstrate in a nation which prides itself on its unity without uniformity.

Dumont F. Kenny, National Conference of Christians and Jews

The Population Explosion and Christian Responsibility. By Richard M. Fagley. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960. 260 pp., $4.25.

At a time when the pressure of mounting population in relation to food supply in the underdeveloped parts of the world has brought the issues of family planning and birth control out into the open as never before in

American history, we are fortunate in having available for study a serious presentation of these problems from a Christian perspective.

The Population Explosion and Christian Responsibility is essentially about "the dilemmas posed by the new pressures of population and the need for a more widely and vigorously supported Christian doctrine of responsible parenthood." Dr. Fagley believes his book is a "tract for the times" urgently addressed "in the first place to the churchmen who share the Evangelical heritage."

This book deserves a much wider audience than this for many reasons. One will find in the first six chapters skillful presentations utilizing some of the best sources available on various aspects of the problem, including the magnitude of the population explosion and its consequences, the role of migration, the relationship of food supply to population, and methods of family limitation. Quantities of technical data have been processed and interpreted in terms readily understandable by an intelligent reader.

Dr. Fagley has made a significant contribution in his presentation of materials relating to religious attitudes and doctrines on family planning of major religions of the world. A preliminary chapter on Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and Communism presents the idea "that cultural rather than doctrinal obstacles form the main hurdle . . ." to family planning. The author then takes up the viewpoints of Judaism and the three Christian branches—Eastern Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism, and Protestantism, and treats with great skill and understanding the teachings of the Old and New Testaments on parenthood and the views of the fathers of the early church. In these chapters there is much original research and material hitherto known only to a few people. For those interested in family planning, this section will prove extremely enlightening.

The book is a mixture of objectivity and polemics. In his perceptive and fair treatment of Roman Catholicism and parenthood, the author divides the Roman Catholic world into "two opposing ecclesiastical fractions or parties"—the "fertility cult" and the "group concerned about socially responsible parenthood." Yet Roman Catholic divisions over official policy are seldom that evident. Hence the author may have overstated his case in this area.

In the chapter on "Food and Population," a more adequate presentation of the views of Professor Colin Clark of Oxford University, who is regarded as one of the chief spokesmen of the Roman Catholic anti-Malthusian school of thought, might have given the discussion just a little more balance. Colin Clark's views are confined to a footnote although a wide variety of sources are quoted in the chapter.

On balance, this is an important contribution to understanding one of the most portentous issues of the day, not only for churchmen gen-

erally, but for students of the problem of family planning and overpopulation. This book is recommended highly for reading.

Constant H. Jacquet, Jr., National Council of Churches

Religion, Science, and Mental Health. By the Academy of Religion and Mental Health. New York: New York University Press, 1959. 107 pp., $3.00.

This little volume constitutes the proceeedings of a three-day conference sponsored by the Academy of Religion and Mental Health and held at Arden House, Harriman, New York, on December 6-8, 1957.

Any book based on the proceedings of a symposium is bound to have severe limitations implicit in the very nature of the volume. The large number of contributors, the comments from the floor, the introductions, the immediate criticisms of prepared speeches—all lead to an inconsistency in style and a disorganized handling of basic themes. These limitations—coupled with the inexcusable absence of an index—are all present in this volume.

Despite these serious shortcomings, the proceedings represent a significant contribution to the religion-mental health conversation. With such participants as Otto Klineberg, O. Hobart Mowrer, Abraham Maslow, Harvey J. Tompkins, Gregory Zilboorg, Harold G. Wolff, Samuel W. Blizzard, Hans Hofmann, Noel Mailloux, and Albert A. Goldman, it could not be otherwise. For these are important voices in the current and animated movement dedicated to bridging the gaps between religion, psychiatry, and the behavioral sciences.

Twenty years ago this volume could not have come into print. At that time, religionists, psychiatrists, and psychologists were in no mood for serious and thoughtful conversations. But in this conference we find all these professions talking about common concerns. This volume is not a record of a mutual admiration society, however. There are real differences, but they are frankly recognized and spelled out.

A valuable aspect of this book is the series of propositions prepared by the major participants. Picking a few at random will indicate the stimulating nature of the problems:

—Clinical psychology is in transition from a former emphasis on repression and release to the concepts of alienation and relationship.

—Reductionism has reached an impasse, and there is active reconsideration of the nature of man.

—Religious experiences, mystical experiences, and peak experiences in general have often been stigmatized as a repression

to the infantile, to the womb, or to the breast. We now know
that there can be, so to speak, a "regression forward" . . . a
union upward. . . .

There is some real meat in these propositions. The Academy of Re-
ligion and Mental Health and The Josiah Macy, Jr., Foundation are to
be congratulated for getting these proceedings of the First Academy Sym-
posium on Inter-Discipline Responsibility for Mental Health into pub-
lished form. It represents a historic event in the development of the re-
ligion and mental health movement.

<div align="right">Orlo Strunk, Jr., West Virginia Wesleyan College</div>

Encyclopedia of American Associations: A Guide to the National Organ-
izations of the United States (Second Edition). Detroit: Gale Research
Company, 1959. 716 pp., $20.00.

"The Americans of all ages, all conditions and all dispositions con-
stantly form associations. They have not only commercial and manufactur-
ing companies in which all take part but associations of a thousand other
kinds, religious, moral, serious, futile, restricted, enormous, or diminutive."
De Tocqueville's observation made over a century ago has even more per-
tinence for an age of "organizational revolution."

For proof, one need only turn to the newly revised encyclopedic list-
ing of 8,892 national organizations in such areas as agriculture, business,
education, labor, public affairs, religion, science, health and welfare. Where-
as commercial organizations and chambers of commerce account for over
half of the total listings, there are 293 religious groups for which informa-
tion is given on membership size, staff, date of founding, purpose, and pub-
lications. Anyone familiar with religious associations will note that many
significant organizations are omitted (such as the National Council on Re-
ligion in Higher Education and the Religious Research Association), while
many little-known groups are included (e.g., National Association of Minis-
ter's Wives, Oriental Boat Mission).

Although this volume doubtless presents the most comprehensive list-
ing of American associations now available, one suspects that there is far
from full coverage, particularly in the religious realm. If all associations
cannot possibly be included for one or another reason, then one might plea
for greater discrimination in the selection process. But as a reference tool
for research workers, religious leaders, librarians, and editors, this new
edition should prove useful.

<div align="right">Robert Lee, Union Theological Seminary</div>

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THE RELIGIOUS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION

Regional meetings to be held during the winter:

Berkeley, California
> Saturday, December 3, 1960, 9 a.m.-5 p.m.
> 230 Wheeler Hall, University of California (Berkeley)
> Chairman, Charles Y. Glock
> University of California, Berkeley, California

Washington, D.C.
> Friday, February 3, 1961, 9 a.m.-8 p.m.
> Wesley Theological Seminary, 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
> Chairman, Clifford C. Ham
> Wesley Theological Seminary, Washington, D.C.

St. Louis, Missouri
> Friday, February 17, 1961, 9:30 a.m.-9 p.m.
> Tuttle Building, 1210 Locust Street
> Chairman, David F. Cox
> St. Louis Council of Churches, St. Louis, Missouri

(Please note that the date of the *St. Louis* meeting has been changed from the one previously announced. The *New Orleans* meeting originally planned for January 13, 1961, has been postponed until early 1962.)
Annual meeting of 1961

Indianapolis, Indiana
> June 16-18, 1961
> Chairman, Walter Kloetzli

Suggestions for speakers and topics for any of the meetings should be sent directly to the chairman for the meeting, or to Walter Kloetzli, National Lutheran Council, 327 South LaSalle Street, Chicago 4, Illinois.